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The Federal Abstention Doctrine: An Analysis
of Its Present Function and Future Application
IN THE LANDMARK CASE of Erie v. Tompkins,' the Supreme
Court directed the United States District Courts to refer to the
substantive law of the forum state in the exercise of their diversity
jurisdiction.2 This decision necessarily assumed that district courts
were fully competent to determine the meaning of local law.
Shortly thereafter, however, the Court questioned the propriety of
a district court ruling on a previously undetermined question of
state law in exercise of its federal jurisdiction.' For example, in
Pullman Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,4 the district court enjoined the
enforcement of an order of the Texas Railroad Commission.5 Ac-
cording to the order, train conductors were to be assigned to segre-
gated cars according to race. The petitioner claimed that the order
violated the fourteenth amendment and the commerce clause. The
district court, however, passed over the constitutional issues and held
that the railroad commission had exceeded the regulatory powers
granted to it by the Texas statutes.6 On appeal, Justice Frankfurter,
speaking for a unanimous Court, reasoned that only the Supreme
Court of Texas could authoritatively decide the meaning of the
Texas statutes. In this respect, therefore, the district court's ruling
was a forecast of state law which might be displaced by a Texas
court in a subsequent case.' The district court was ordered to remit
the parties to the state courts for an interpretation of the statutes,
but to retain jurisdiction to ultimately decide the constitutional ques-
tion.8 Thus, the Supreme Court created what has become known as
the abstention doctrine, requiring the federal and state courts to act
jointly on a single cause.
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. Id. at 78.
3. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
4. 33 F. Supp. 675 (W.D. Tex. 1940).
5. A three judge district court, under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1958), has jurisdiction to
enjoin the enforcement of a state statute or administrative order violative of the federal
constitution. See generally, Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S.
341 (1951).
6. Pullman Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 33 F. Supp. 675, 678 (W.D. Tex. 1940).
7. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499 (1941).
8. Id. at 501-02.
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I. FUNCTION OF THE DOCTRINE
A. Underlying Philosophy
The abstention doctrine purports to remedy two main evils:
(1) friction between federal and state courts over local issues;9
and (2) a premature adjudication of constitutional issues." Some
of the cases appear to justify the doctrine on the premise that state
courts are more competent to handle complex issues of state law
than are federal district courts.1 Even if it be admitted that federal
courts do not have the power to render decisions on state law which
will be binding on the highest court of a state, it is quite another
thing to question the competency of the federal courts to resolve a
previously undecided issue of state law. If the underlying philoso-
phy of the doctrine is lack of competence in the federal court to de-
cide questions involving state law, the rule could be logically ex-
tended without restriction to include all cases requiring a construc-
tion of doubtful state law. Such an extension would of course dras-
tically restrict the usefulness of federal diversity jurisdiction. While
it would be presumptuous to ascribe to the Pullman case an inten-
tion on the part of the Court to curtail federal diversity jurisdiction,
at least two of the Justices who decided that case have, in the process
of discussing abstention elsewhere, indicated their antipathy toward
diversity jurisdiction.' 2
Abstention may be viewed as a hasty compromise, fashioned to
maintain state sovereignty in the face of an increased grant of in-
junctive power to the district courts by Congress. As such, it is only
one of several judicial1" and legislative' 4 restrictions placed upon
that power. However, if this was to be the function of the doctrine,
it has far outstripped its potential. Whatever the metaphysic be-
hind the doctrine may have been, the Court today appears to be
more concerned with the effect of abstention on the immediate liti-
9. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); East Coast Lumber Ter-
minal, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 174 F.2d 106 (2d Cit. 1949); see AFL v. Watson,
327 U.S. 582 (1946).
10. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960); Rescue Army v. Municipal
Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947); Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168 (1942).
11. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
12. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 334 (1943) (Douglas, J. concurring);
id. at 337 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
13. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951) (reluctance of courts to enjoin crim-
inal prosecution).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1958) (three judge court required); 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1958)
(direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court); 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1958) (no injunctions
on rate making).
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gants than with the doctrine's impact on federal-state jurispru-
dence."u
B. Application of the Doctrine
The abstention doctrine will be useful whenever a federal dis-
trict court is confronted with the necessity of interpreting a state
statute which has not had an authoritative constructionby a supreme
court of a state. However, if no serious question exists as to the
proper interpretation of a statute, utilization of the abstention doc-
trine constitutes an abuse of discretion. 6 Also, no matter how com-
plex the point of state law involved is, an authoritative decision by
the state's supreme court on the point must have the potential effect
of obviating a decision on a federal question which is also before the
district court.17  The vast majority of abstention cases arise when a
petitioner seeks an injunction against the enforcement of a' state
statute or the ruling of an administrative agency before a three
judge district court. Invariably, the first question the district court
must resolve is whether the statute applies to the petitioner or
whether the administrative agency possessed the statutory authority
to issue the ruling in question. A decision favorable to the peti-.
tioner on either of these questions would be dispositive of the case
before the district court.
Generally, the United States Supreme Court has not sanctioned
application of the doctrine unless the decision on the federal ques-
tion which may be avoided involves a question under the federal
constitution. In Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc, 8 the Court stated
that "avoidance of constitutional adjudications ... is part of the wis-
dom.., of the Pullman Co. case.""9 But a few cases have applied
the abstention doctrine even in the absence of a constitutional ques-
tion where there was a showing of exceptional circumstances. One
rather remarkable decision in this respect is Louisiana Power & Light
Co. v. City of Thibodaux.2  There, the district court stayed eminent
domain proceedings in a diversity suit and deferred to the state courts
15. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical
Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
16. City of Chicago v. Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958); United States
v. Bureau of Revenue, 291 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1961).
17. Public Util. Comm'n v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456 (1943); Schempp v.
School Dist. 201 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Pa. 1962), alf'd, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
18. 316 U.S. 168 (1942).
19. Id. at 173; see also Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949).
20. 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
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for an interpretation of a statute authorizing the city to condemn
land. The Supreme Court upheld this action, reasoning that emi-
nent domain proceedings are "intimately involved with the sover-
eign prerogative."21 However, in a companion case decided the same
day, the Court found that eminent domain proceedings in a district
court would not necessarily require abstention.22
In cases where a constitutional question has not been present,
several lower courts have justified abstention on such grounds as the
pendency of other proceedings on the same issues, a congestion of
the federal docket,24 and a promise by state officers to expedite the
state proceedings. 25 The Supreme Court has, however, with the ex-
ception of the Thibodaux case and a case involving the scope of the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court,26 sanctioned the use of absten-
tion only in cases involving constitutional questions.
(1) Discretion of the District Judge.-Initially, the postpone-
ment of a petitioner's federal remedy was justified by reference to
the traditional discretion of the chancellor over his own docket.27
The validity of this approach remained unquestioned as long as the
court was involved in an equitable proceeding. More recently, how-
ever, the doctrine has been predicated on the ordinary discretion
vested in a federal district court, and restriction of application of
the doctrine to cases involving equitable remedies has been express-
ly repudiated.28
This reliance on the discretion of a district court to withhold ex-
ercise of its jurisdiction devolved into the persistent dicta that ap-
plication of the abstention doctrine reposes within the sound discre-
tion of the district judge.' As the doctrine developed, however, it
21. Id. at 28.
22. County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959). The only
practical difference between the Mashuda and Thibodaux cases appears to be that Justice
Stewart felt that a district judge should be allowed to abstain in the face of complex
state law, and therefore, switch sides in the Thibodaux case. Louisiana Power & Light
Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 31 (1959).
23. General Radio Co. v. Superior Elec. Co., 293 F.2d 949 (1st Cir. 1961); Martin
v. Graybar Elec. Co., 266 F.2d 202 (7th Cit. 1959).
24. P. Beiersdorf & Co. v. McGohey, 187 F.2d 14 (2d Cit. 1951).
25. Division 1287, Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec., Ry & Motor Coach Employees,
AFL-CIO v. Dalton, 206 F. Supp. 629, 635 (W.D. Mo. 1962).
26. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940).
27. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
28. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
29. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943); City of Chicago v.
Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168 (1942); East Coast Lumber Terminal, Inc. v.
Town of Babylon, 174 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1949).
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became clear that if the requirements of abstention were met there
could indeed be no discretion in the district judge." Thus, it might
be said that the district judge had discretion to abstain from exercis-
ing jurisdiction, but not to retain it. But the attitude of the Supreme
Court toward abstention appears to be changing; and with this
change there has been some re-evaluation of the district court's dis-
cretion. Today, the district court may, in certain cases, be said to
have discretion to refuse abstention."'
(2) Dismissal in Administrative Cases.-The district courts
have clear jurisdiction to review certain state administrative orders.3 2
However, premature interference by federal district courts with spe-
cialized state administrative proceedings can produce considerable
confusion and federal-state friction.33 In an attempt to cope with
these problems, the Supreme Court quite naturally borrowed from
the rationale of the abstention cases. But the resulting line of cases,
all of which involve dismissal of the bill rather than retention,
should not be classed with the abstention cases.
In the administrative law area, the courts have long recognized
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.3 4 If the state
courts form part of the state administrative network, the appropriate
state judicial review may be necessary before the federal courts may
hear a case. 5 In Burford v. Sun Oil Co.," the Texas Railway Com-
mission exercised regulatory control over the placement of new oil
wells. The petitioner brought suit in a federal district court to en-
join a Commission order allowing the digging of a new well. The
petitioner alleged that this order deprived him of his property rights
in existing wells. The state had established a systematic procedure
for review of such orders. One court had been given authority to
undertake independent fact finding, and thereby exercised a super-
visory function over the Commission. Since a decision regarding
such controversies required a specialized knowledge of geology and
engineering,37 the Supreme Court ordered dismissal of the case in
the district court, reasoning that an adequate and indeed superior
30. Shipman v. Du Pre, 339 U.S. 321 (1950).
31. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958).
33. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
34. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938).
35. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 230 (1908).
36. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
37. Apparently the lack of expertise on the part of the district court had caused it to
render contradictory and impractical decisions.
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forum was available in the state courts. Although the Court did not
rely on the abstention doctrine, the Pullman case and other absten-
tion cases were cited as supporting exceptions to federal jurisdiction
in cases involving thorny issues of state law.38 In Alabama Pub.
Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry.,39 the state law involved was clear;
nevertheless, the Court ordered dismissal apparently in order to
avoid interfering prospectively with a state system of administra-
tive and judicial remedy.4" Here, however, the Pullman case was
expressly repudiated as authority.4
The administrative law cases are not based on the same policy
considerations as the abstention cases, nor do they result in a reten-
tion of jurisdiction and ultimate decision on the merits by the dis-
trict court. Unfortunately, however, the use of the abstention ra-
tionale in these cases has served to becloud the distinctions. Accord-
ingly, some courts have borrowed from both lines of authority. This
has resulted in abstention from non-administrative cases solely be-
cause of the complexity or uncertainty of a state law.42
I1. ULTIMATE DISPOSITION OF THE CONTROVERSY
A. Compliance With the Doctrine
Once the district court has decided to abstain and remit the peti-
tioner to the state court, the difficulties created by the doctrine are
far from terminated. Theoretically, the petitioner will eventually
return to the district court to pursue his federal remedy in a trial de
novo.'3 But if the district court is to retain jurisdiction, construct a
trial record, and render an ultimate decision on the merits, the liti-
gation in the state court should result in something less than a final
adjudication on the merits. Well reasoned principles of res judicata
or collateral estoppel would deny the federal courts the right to
adjudicate anew a controversy which had been finally determined
38. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 331 (1943).
39. 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
40. Id. at 349-50.
41. Id. at 344.
42. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70, 86 (5th Cit. 1962); A.F.L. Motors,
Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 183 F. Supp. 56, 59-60 (E.D. Wis. 1960).
43. The federal district courts possess unquestioned jurisdiction to decide the constitu-
tionality of state statutes or administrative orders. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958). Not
even the Supreme Court should have the right to sweep aside this congressional grant
of jurisdiction. The abstention doctrine directs, therefore, that ultimate jurisdiction
be retained while the exercise of that jurisdiction is delayed. Harrison v. NAACP, 360
U.S. 167 (1959).
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in state courts." The Supreme Court -has from time to time dis-
cussed the impact of res judicata on the operation of the abstention
doctrine,45 but no attempt has been made to clarify the problem.
Rather, the more recent cases indicate that the entire abstention doc-
trine is to be considered as an exception to the principles of res judi-
cata. In discussing this conflict, Justice Douglas has stated that
"res judicata is not a constitutional principle."46
(1) The Election Concept.-In order to limit the issues pre-
sented to the state court, the Supreme Court has formulated a con-
cept of election. Thus, if a party presents both a federal question
and a state law question to the state court for a final decision, he is
thereby held to have elected an exclusive state remedy.
The consequence of this election is foreclosure of the right to
return to the district court." The scope of the state court decree
is determined not so much by the nature of the decree, but rather
by the actions and intentions of the parties in the state court. But,
requiring the state court to render an advisory decision on questions
of state law and allowing finality of its decision on questions in-
volving federal law to the extent that a party to the suit elects to
lend finality to the state ruling are strange means of avoiding
federal-state friction.
In addition, even if a decision on the issues involving state law
has been segregated from other issues raised by the cause of action,
it may fail to present a justiciable controversy. In Leiter Minerals,
Inc. v. California Co.,48 the petitioner sought a state declaratory
judgment on a question of state' law, but reserved the issues of
federal law for resubmission to the district court. Although the
state court stated that the petitioner did not present a justiciable
controversy, it nevertheless rendered a decision "out of respect for
and as a courtesy to" the Supreme Court of the United States.49
Apparently, if the state court refuses to entertain the suit, the parties
may return to the district court for a determination of all the issues.5"
Ordinarily, the only vehicle for obtaining the required ruling on
state law will be a declaratory judgment action. But, even the
44. Note, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1358, 1365 (1960).
45. Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 491-92 (1949).
46. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
47. Ibid.; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 427 (1963).
48. 241 La. 915, 132 So. 2d 845 (1961).
49. ld. at 921, 132 So. 2d at 850.
50. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 421-22 n.12
(1964).
1965]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
declaratory judgment statutes do not generally provide the courts
with the authority to render opinions unless an actual controversy
will thereby be terminated.5 In fact, there appears to be only
one state that provides a procedure for rendering purely advisory
opinions on state law for the federal courts.52 Widespread adoption
of similar statutes might solve many of the problems of the absten-
tion doctrine. However, whatever the state procedure might be, in
order to fulfill the requirements of the abstention doctrine it must
provide for a ruling by the highest court in the state.53 The states
may well be hesitant to burden their supreme tribunals with such
a task.
(2) Requisites for Returning to the State Court.-Despite all
of these difficulties, the petitioner will not satisfy the requirements
of the doctrine by raising only issues of state law in the state court
In Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm. v. Wind-
sor,54 the Supreme Court reasoned that the ruling of a state
court without reference to the petitioner's constitutional arguments
will not serve to present constitutional issues to the district court in a
concrete form.5" The Court held that the petitioner, who had begun
his litigation in the district court four years before and who had
thereafter argued his cause in six courts, had to return to the state
courts to raise the issues of state law "in the light of federal constitu-
tional objections."56 Thus, the Windsor case57 requires that state
courts at least be apprised of the constitutional objections to the con-
tested application of the state law. Thus, in order to comply with the
spirit of the Windsor case, the petitioner must at least present the
federal question in his brief and argument. After thereby having
been apprised of the constitutional issues, the state court must pro-
ceed to decide, at least tentatively, the federal constitutional issues
before moving on to interpret the state law. This is so because a
state court will naturally attempt to construe state law to avoid an
unconstitutional interpretation. "8 Therefore, a conscientious court
cannot interpret a statute without weighing the constitutional im-
51. Walker v. Walker, 132 Ohio St. 137, 5 N.E.2d 405 (1936).
52. FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 25.031 (1961).
53. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941); United States v.
Cavell, 162 F. Supp. 319 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
54. 353 U.S. 364 (1957).
55. Id. at 366.
56. Id. at 364.
57. ibid.
58. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
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plications of that interpretation. A state court also possesses the
authority and indeed the duty to rule on the federal constitutionality
of its own statutes.59 After hearing all of the arguments relating
to the state issues, the state court may feel compelled to rule on
the constitutionality of the statute which it has been asked to inter-
pret. Such a determination, if requested by the petitioner, is re-
viewable by the United States Supreme Court."° The state decision
is final for purposes of such review, despite the fact that the district
court has retained jurisdiction to decide the constitutional issues."'
But, if the petitioner elects to proceed along these lines, he loses
his right to return to the district court."
A litigant in a state court has reason to be fearful that he
either may not fully comply with the requirements of abstention,
or may over-comply and thus lose his right to return to the district
court. Thus, in England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examin-
ers, 3 the Court recognized that a conscientious adherence to the
Windsor 4 case might lead a petitioner to argue his constitutional
rights in the state court. The Court further recognized that the
petitioner could not prevent the state court from deciding the issues
once -presented. Thus, in the England case, the petitioner advocated
his federal rights throughout the litigation and the Supreme Court
of Louisiana upheld the constitutionality of the statute involved.
Rather than seek review in the Supreme Court, the petitioner im-
mediately returned to the district court. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court held that the petitioner had elected to litigate his claim in
the state court. 5 But the litigants were not prevented from re-
turning to the district court. Apparently, the Court recognized the
impossibility of following the guidelines of prior cases, and the liti-
gants were allowed to return to the district court even though they
had technically elected to pursue the state remedy. However, the
Court added a caveat that this liberality would not aid future liti-
59. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
60. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
61. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). Again
it is possible to see the inevitable conflict between the abstention doctrine and the con-
cept of finality of state adjudication. The state decision is final for purposes of Supreme
Court review, but not final for purposes of res judicata.
62. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 427 (1963).
63. 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
64. Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364
(1957).
65. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.. 411 (1964).
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gants.66 It then went on to provide a formula to guide future liti-
gants in this respect, suggesting that the petitioner at the outset
of the state litigation expressly reserve his right to return to the
district court. Hence, apparently a mere reservation affixed to the
petition would of its own force nullify the effect of a state court
decision on a federal question."7
In light of the Windsor and England cases, acceptable litiga-
tion of state issues is a very difficult task. The federal issues must
be presented to the state courts,"3 but not argued. 9 But presenting
a constitutional issue to an appellate court is tantamount to making
an argument thereon. Clearly, the petitioner should not request
the state court to decide the federal issue. And absent such a re-
quest, a ruling by the state court on a federal question should not
constitute an election. Yet, once the decision is handed down, how
is the petitioner to prove that he did not in the heat of argument
request it?
B. Impact of Recent Civil Rights Litigation
The expense and delay occasioned by the abstention doctrine can
be prohibitive for all but the most affluent. "The pursuit of justice
is not an academic exercise. There are no foundations to finance
the resolution of nice state law questions involved in federal court
litigation.' 7° The problem thus becomes exceedingly acute for an
impecunious litigant in a civil rights case. Thus, the courts have
traditionally been reluctant to allow abstention in such cases.7' More
recently, abstention by a district court has been recognized as an
abuse of discretion where individual liberties are involved. 72  For
example, the case of Baggett v. Bullitt" appeared to present a classic
situation for the application of the doctrine. There, two statutory
loyalty oaths for teachers in the State of Washington were attacked
as being unconstitutionally vague. The district court had upheld a
1955 Act as being similar to the Smith Act.74  However, the district
66. Id. at 422.
67. Id. at 421-22.
68. Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364,
366 (1957).
69. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
70. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 228 (1960).
71. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
72. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
73. 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
74. Smith Act, as amended, 70 Stat. 623 (1956), 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1958); upheld
by the United States Supreme Court in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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court abstained from ruling on a 1931 Act because the state supreme
court had never handed down an interpretation." The United States
Supreme Court found that the 1955 Act was unconstitutionally
vague. The Court felt no need to allow the state courts to rule on
the meaning of the act, despite the fact that the Smith Act was de-
clared to be inapposite because its defects had been cured by federal
judicial interpretation.76 The Court went on to declare the 1931
Act unconstitutional without remanding the case to the district court
for decision on the merits." In so holding, the Court declared that
abstention is improper absent special circumstances.78 Traditional-
ly, however, the presence of a federal constitutional question has
been held sufficient justification for abstention. 9  But where the
delay inherent in the abstention doctrine involves first amendment
freedoms the Court has recognized the necessity for an exception."0
The recent civil rights decisions appear to have forced re-evalua-
tion of the doctrine. At the present time, the district courts appear to.
have the discretion to refuse abstention even though they are thereby
forced to decide the constitutionality of a state law. If the constitu-
tional issue is substantial,81 or the unconstitutionality of the state
action is dear,82 the obscurity of the state law has been held to be
immaterial. The Court has thus apparently recognized the onerous
burden that the doctrine normally imposes. But unfortunately, this
apparent shift in the Court's mood is anything but dear. One thing
is dear, however, and that is that a digest of all the decisions on
abstention no longer provides a clear direction to the district court.
IV. FUTURE OF THE DOCTRINE
Abstention appears to be doomed to ultimate collapse under the
weight of its own unworkability. While this will be accomplished
only in time, it is unfortunate that the Court does not take Justice
However, recent cases have made substantial inroads into the Dennis decision. For a
further discussion of this area see Note, Recent Developments In Communist Control
Act Prosecutions, 16 W. REs. L REV. 206 (1964).
75. Baggett v. Bullitt, 215 F. Supp. 439 (W.D. Wash. 1963).
76. Baggetr v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
77. Id. at 371-72.
78. Id. at 366.
79. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
80. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 371-72 (1964).
81. Schempp v. School Dist., 201 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd, 374 U.S. 203
(1963).
82. Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962).
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Douglas' advice and re-evaluate the entire doctrine.83 The doctrine
no longer appears to be furthering the purposes of federalism. Dis-
trict courts have shown themselves to be entirely competent to
decide issues of state law in diversity cases. Furthermore, the
present Court appears to be anything but reluctant to decide con-
stitutional issues. The purposes for the original adoption of absten-
tion are not being served, and neither, it seems, is justice.
JAmEs G. GOWAN
83. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
